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I1JLL TEXT OF OPINIONS
No 92-833

KFVTN ALBRIGHT, PETITIONER v. ROGER
OLIVER, ETC , FT AJ
ON WHIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
No 92-833

Argued October 12,1993—Decided January 24,1994

Upon learning that Illinois authorities had issued an arrest warrant
charging him with the Bale of a substance which looked like an
illegal drug, petitioner Albright surrendered to respondent Oliver,
a policeman, and was released after posting bond. At a preliminary hearing, Oliver testified that Albright told the look-alike
substance to a third party, and the court found probable cause to
bind Albright over for trial. However, the court later dismissed
the action on the ground that the charge did not state an offense
under state law. Albright then filed this suit under 42 U. S. C.
§1983, alleging that Oliver deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment—his "liberty interest"—to
be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The
District Court dismissed on the ground that the complaint did not
state a claim under §1983. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort
actionable under §1983 only if accompanied by incarceration, loss
of employment, or some other "palpable consequenc[e]."
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
975 F. 2d 343, affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE

SCALIA, and JUSTICE GINSBURG, concluded that Albright's claimed
right to be free from prosecution without probable cause must be
judged under the Fourth Amendment, and that substantive due
process, with its "scarce and open-ended" "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking," Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S.
,
,
can afford Albright no relief. Where a particular Amendment
"provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection"
against a particular sort of government behavior, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process/
must be the guide for analyzing" such a claim. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395. The Fourth Amendment addresses the
matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty, and the Court has noted
that Amendment's relevance to the liberty deprivations that go
hand in hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U. S. 103, 114. The Court has said that the accused is not
"entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute." Id., at 118-119. But Albright was not merely charged; he
submitted himself to arrest. No view is expressed as to whether
his claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he
has not presented the question in his certiorari petition.
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by JUSTICE THOMAS, determined that
Albright's due process claim concerns not his arrest but instead
the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution against
him. The due process requirements for criminal proceedings do
not include a standard for the initiation of a prosecution. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the common-law interest in
freedom from malicious prosecution is protected by the Due Process Clause, there is neither need nor legitimacy in invoking 42
U. S. C. §1983 in this case, given the fact that Illinois provides a
tort remedy for malicious prosecution and the Court's holding in
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 535-544, that a state actor's
random and unauthorized deprivation of such a due process interest cannot be challenged under §1983 so long as the State provides
an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are
requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

JUSTICE SOUTER concluded that, because this case presents no
substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth Amendment
is generally thought to redress already, petitioner has not justified
recognition of a substantive due process violation in his prosecution without probable cause. Substantive due process should be
reserved for otherwise homeless substantial claims, and should not
be relied on when doing so will duplicate protection that a more
specific constitutional provision already bestows. Petitioner's
asserted injuries—including restraints on his movement, damage
to his reputation, and mental anguish—are not alleged to have
flowed from the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from
the ensuing police seizure of his person; have been treated by the
Courts of Appeals as within the ambit of compensability under 42
U. S. C. §1983 for Fourth Amendment violations; and usually
occur only after an arrest or other seizure
REHNQUIST, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and GINSBURG,
JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., and GINSBURG, J., filed concurring opinions
KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
THOMAS, J., joined. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. STEVENS, J , filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST

announced the judgment of

the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE
O'CONNOR, JUSTICE SCALIA, and

JUSTICE GINSBURG

joined
A warrant was issued for petitioner's arrest by Illinois
authorities, and upon learning of it he surrendered and
was released on bail. The prosecution was later dismissed on the ground that the charge did not state an
offense under Illinois law. Petitioner asks us to recognize a substantive right under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal
prosecution except upon probable cause. We decline to
do so.
This case comes to us from a decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirming the grant of a
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6), and we must therefore
accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as
true. Illinois authorities issued an arrest warrant for
petitioner Kevin Albright, charging him on the basis of
a previously filed criminal information with the sale of
a substance which looked like an illegal drug. When he
learned of the outstanding warrant, petitioner surrendered to respondent, Roger Oliver, a police detective
employed by the city of Macomb, but denied his guilt of
such an offense. He was released after posting bond,
one of the conditions of which was that he not leave the
State without permission of the court.1
1
Before the criminal information was filed, one Veda Moore, mi
undercover informant, had told Oliver that the bought cocaine from
one John Albright, Jr., at a student hotel in Macomb. The "cocaine*
turned out to be baking powder, however, and the grand jury
indicted John Albright, Jr., for telling a look-alike" substance.
When Detective Oliver went to serve the arrest warrant, he discovered that John Albright, Jr., was a retired pharmacist in his sixties,
nd apparently realised he was on a false scent. After discovering
hat it could not have been the elderly Albright's son, John David,
who was involved in the incident, Detective Oliver contacted Moore
to see if the sale was actually made to petitioner Kevin Albnght, a
second son of John Albright, Jr. Moore confirmed that petitioner
Kevin Albright made the sale.

NOTE: Where it is deemed desirable, a syllabus (beadnote) will be
released • • • at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes
no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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At a preliminary hearing, respondent Oliver testified
that petitioner sold the look-alike substance to Moore,
and the court found probable cause to bind petitioner
over for trial. At a later pretrial hearing, the court
dismissed the criminal action against petitioner on the
ground that the charge did not state an offense under
Illinois law.
Albright then instituted this action under Rev. Stat.
§ 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against Detective Oliver in
his individual and official capacity, alleging that Oliver
deprived him of substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment—his liberty interest"—to be free
from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.2
The District Court granted respondent's motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(bX6) on the ground that the
complaint did not state a claim under §1983.* The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 975
F. 2d 343 (1992), relying on our decision in Paul v.
Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976). The Court of Appeals held
that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983 only if accompanied
by incarceration or loss of employment or some other
"palpable consequence]." 975 F. 2d, at 346-347. The
panel of the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "just as in
the garden-variety public-officer defamation case that
does not result in exclusion from an occupation, state
tort remedies should be adequate and the heavy weaponry of constitutional litigation can be left at rest." Id.,
at 347.4 We granted certiorari, 507 U. S.
(1993),
'The complaint also named the City of Macomb as a defendant to
the § 1983 action, and charged a common-law mahcious prosecution
claim against Detective Oliver.
'The District Court also held that Detective Oliver was entitled to
a defense of qualified immunity, and that the complaint failed to
allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability against the city
of Macomb. The District Court also dismissed without prejudice the
common-law claim of malicious prosecution against Detective Oliver.
These issues are not before this Court.
4
As noted by the Court of Appeals below, the extent to which a
claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one "on
which there is an embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion." 975
F. 2d, at 345, citing Brummett v. Camble, 946 F. 2d 1178, 1180,
n. 2 (CA5 1991) (cataloging divergence of approaches by the Courts
of Appeals). Most of the lower courts recognize some form of malicious prosecution action under § 1983. The disagreement among the
courts concerns whether malicious prosecutions, standing alone, can
violate the Constitution. The most expansive approach is exemplified by the Third Circuit, which holds that the elements of a malicious prosecution action under § 1983 are the same as the commonlaw tort of mahcious prosecution. See, e. g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.
2d 66, 70 (CA3 1988) (*[T]he elements of liability for the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution under § 1983 coincide with those
of the common law tort"). See also, Sanders v. English, 950 F. 2d
1152, 1159 (CA5 1992) (10]ur circuit recognizes causes of action
under § 1983 for false arrest, illegal detention . . . and malicious
prosecution" because these causes of action "implicate the constitutional 'guarantees of the fourth and fourteenth amendments'. . .");
Robinson v. Aforu/jS, 895 F. 2d 649 (CA10 1990); Strength v. Hubert,
854 F. 2d 421, 426, and n. 5 (CAll 1988) (recognizing that "freedom
from mahcious prosecution is a federal right protected by § 1983").
Other Circuits, however, require a showing of some injury or deprivation of a constitutional magnitude in addition to the traditional
elements of common-law malicious prosecution. The exact standards
announced by the courts escape easy classification. See, e. g.t
Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F. 2d 404, 409
(CA1 1990) (the challenged conduct must be "so egregious that it
violated substantive or procedural due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F. 2d 556,
561-562 (CA9 1987) ("[T]he general rule is that a claim of malicious
prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 if process is
available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy . . .
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and while we affirm the judgment below, we do so on
different grounds. We hold that it is the Fourth
Amendment, and not substantive due process, under
which petitioner Albright's claims must be judged.
Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive
rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred.* Baker v. McCollan,
443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). The first step in any
such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right
allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386,
394 (1989); and Baker v. McCollan, supra, at 140.
Petitioner's claim before this Court is a very limited
one. He claims that the action of respondents infringed
his substantive due process right to be free of prosecution without probable cause. He does not claim that
Illinois denied him the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does he claim
a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, notwithstanding the fact that his surrender to the State's show
of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19
(1968); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596
(1989).5
We begin analysis of petitioner's claim by repeating
our observation in Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S.
,
(1992) (slip op., at 9). "As a general matter,
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended." The protections of
substantive due process have for the most part been
accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. See, e. g.,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U. S.
,
(1992) (slip op., at 5-6) (describing cases
in which substantive due process rights have been recognized). Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution
except on the basis of probable cause is markedly
different from those recognized in this group of cases.
Petitioner relies on our observations in cases such as
United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 746 (1987), and
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986), that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
confers both substantive and procedural rights. This is
undoubtedly true, but it sheds little light on the scope
of substantive due process. Petitioner points in particular to language from Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S.
516, 527 (1884), later quoted in Daniels, supra, stating
that the words "by the law of the land" from the Magna
Carta were "'intended to secure the individual from the
[hjowever, 'an exception exists to the general rule when a malicious
prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal
protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person
to a denial of constitutional rights'*); Coogan v. Wixom, 820 F. 2d
170, 175 (CA6 1987) (in addition to elements of malicious prosecution under state law, plaintiff must show an egregious misuse of a
legal proceeding resulting in a constitutional deprivation). In
holding that malicious prosecution is not actionable under § 1983
unless it is accompanied by incarceration, loss of protected status, or
soma other palpable consequence, the Seventh Circuit's decision
below places it in this latter camp. In view of our disposition of
this case, it is evident that substantive due process may not furnish
the constitutional peg on which to hang such a "tort"
•Thus, Albright may have missed the statute of limitations for any
claim he had based on an unconstitutional arrest or seizure. 975
F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992). We express no opinion as to the timeliness of any such claim he might have.
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arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.'" This,
too, may be freely conceded, but it does not follow that,
in all of the various aspects of a criminal prosecution,
the only inquiry mandated by the Constitution is
whether, in the view of the Court, the governmental
action in question was "arbitrary."
Hurt ado held that the Due Process Clause did not
make applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment's
requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime
be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury. In the
more than 100 years which have elapsed since Hurtado
was decided, the Court has concluded that a number of
the procedural protections contained in the Bill of Rights
were made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961),
overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), and
holding the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
applicable to the States; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1
(1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78
(1908), and holding the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination applicable to the States;
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), overruling
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), and holding
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applicable to the States; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U. S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S.
455 (1942), and holding that the Sixth Amendment's
right to counsel was applicable to the States. See also
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right applicable to the States);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process applicable to the
States); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)
(Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applicable to the
States).
This course of decision has substituted, in these areas
of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the
various provisions of the Bill of Rights embodied in the
first 10 Amendments to the Constitution for the more
generalized language contained in the earlier cases
construing the Fourteenth Amendment. It was through
these provisions of the Bill of Rights that their Framers
sought to restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by
the Government in particular situations. Where a
particular amendment "provides an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection" against a particular
sort of government behavior, "that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,'
must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Graham
v. Connor, 490 U. S., at 395.6
'Justice STEVENS' dissent faults us for ignoring, inter alia, our
decision in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). Winship undoubtedly rejected the notion that all of the required incidents of a
fundamentally fair trial were to be found in the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, but it did so as a matter of procedural due process:
' T h i s notion [that the government must prove the elements of a
criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt]—basic in our law and
rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a requirement and a
safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content
of "due process."'" Id% at 362, quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S.
790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Similarly, other cases relied on by the dissent, including Mooney
v. Holokan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935), Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264
(1959), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United
States, 405 U. S. 150 (1972), and United States v. Agurs, All U. S.
97 (1976), were accurately described in the latter opinion as "dealing
with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Id,
at 107.
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We think this principle is likewise applicable here.
The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty, and drafted the Fourth Amendment to
address it. The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's
relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in
hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to any extended restraint on
liberty following an arrest). We have said that the
accused is not "entitled to judicial oversight or review of
the decision to prosecute." Id., at 118-119. See also
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 545 (1962); hem
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 (1913). But here
petitioner was not merely charged; he submitted himself
to arrest.
We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim
would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he
has not presented that question in his petition for
certiorari. We do hold that substantive due process,
with its "scarce and open-ended" "guideposts," Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U. S., at
(slip op., at 9), can
afford him no relief.7
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Affirmed.
concurring.
One can conceive of many abuses of the trial process
(for example, the use of a patently biased judge, see
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455, 465-466
(1971)), that might cause a criminal sentence to be a
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due
process. But here there was no criminal sentence (the
indictment was dismissed), and so the only deprivation
of life, liberty or property, if any, consisted of
petitioner's pretrial arrest. I think it unlikely that the
procedures constitutionally "due," with regard to an
arrest, consist of anything more than what the Fourth
Amendment specifies; but petitioner has in any case not
invoked "procedural" due process.
JUSTICE SCALIA,

Except insofar as our decisions have included within
the Fourteenth Amendment certain explicit substantive
protections of the Bill of Rights—an extension I accept
because it is both long established and narrowly limited—I reject the proposition that the Due Process
Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather
than merely guarantees certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty. See TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S.
,
(1993) (SCALIA, J., concurring). As I have acknowledged,
Petitioner appears to have argued in the Court of Appeals some
variant of a violation of his constitutional right to interstate travel
because of the condition imposed upon him pursuant to his release
on bond. But he has not presented any such question in his petition for certiorari, and has not briefed the issue here. We therefore
do not consider it.
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however, see Michael H. v. Gerald D.t 491 U. S. 110,
121 (1989) (opinion of SCALIA, J.), this Court's current
jurisprudence is otherwise. But that jurisprudence
rejects "the more generalized notion of 'substantive due
process'" at least to this extent: it cannot be used to
impose additional requirements upon such of the states'
criminal processes as are already addressed (and left
without such requirements) by the Bill of Rights.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395 (1989). That
proscription applies here. The Bill of Rights sets forth,
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, procedural guarantees relating to the period before and during trial,
including a guarantee (the Grand Jury Clause) regarding
the manner of indictment. Those requirements are not
to be supplemented through the device of "substantive
due process."
For these reasons, in addition to those set forth by the
the judgment here should be affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE,

concurring.
I agree with the plurality that Albright's claim against
the police officer responsible for his arrest is properly
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than
under the heading of substantive due process. See ante,
at 4. I therefore join the plurality opinion and write
separately to indicate more particularly my reasons for
viewing this case through a Fourth Amendment lens.
Albright's factual allegations convey that Detective
Oliver notoriously disobeyed the injunction against
unreasonable seizures imposed on police officers by the
Fourth Amendment, and Albright appropriately invoked
that Amendment as a basis for his claim. See App. to
Pet. for Cert. A-37, A-53. Albright's submission to
arrest unquestionably constituted a seizure for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment. See ante, at 5. And, as the
Court of Appeals recognized, if the facts were as Albright alleged, then Oliver lacked cause to suspect, let
alone apprehend him. 975 F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992);
see post, at 2-3 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Yet in his presentations before this Court, Albright
deliberately subordinated invocation of the Fourth
Amendment and pressed, instead, a substantive due
process right to be free from prosecution without
probable cause.1 This strategic decision appears to have
been predicated on two doubtful assumptions, the first
relating to the compass of the Fourth Amendment, the
second, to the time frame for commencing this civil
action.
Albright may have feared that courts would narrowly
define the Fourth Amendment's key term "seizure" so as
to deny full scope to his claim. In particular, he might
have anticipated a holding that the "seizure" of his
person ended when he was released from custody on
bond, and a corresponding conclusion that Oliver's
JUSTICE GINSBURG,

'Albright's presentations essentially carve up the officer's conduct,
though all part of a single scheme, so that the actions complained of
match common law tort categories: first, false arrest (Fourth Amendment's domain); next, malicious prosecution (Fifth Amendment territory).
In my view, the constitutional tort 42 U. S. C. {1983 authorizes stands
on its own, influenced by the substance, but not tied to the formal
categories and procedures, of the common law. According the Fourth
Amendment full sway, I would not force Albright's case into a different
mold.
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allegedly misleading testimony at the preliminary
hearing escaped Fourth Amendment interdiction.2
The Fourth Amendment's instruction to police officers
seems to me more purposive and embracing. This Court
has noted that the common law may aid contemporary
inquiry into the meaning of the Amendment's term
"seizure." See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621,
626, n. 2 (1991). At common law, an arrested person's
seizure was deemed to continue even after release from
official custody. See, e.g., 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown *124 ("he that is bailed, is in supposition of law
still in custody, and the parties that take him to bail
are in law his keepers"); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
*297 (bail in both civil and criminal cases is "a delivery
or bailment, of a person to his sureties, . . . he being
supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead
of going to gaol"). The purpose of an arrest at common
law, in both criminal and civil cases, was "only to
compel an appearance in court," and "that purpose is
equally answered, whether the sheriff detains [the
suspect's] person, or takes sufficient security for his
appearance, called bail." 3 id., at *290 (civil cases); 4
id., at *297 (nature of bail is the same in criminal and
civil cases). The common law thus seems to have
regarded the difference between pretrial incarceration
and other ways to secure a defendant's court attendance
as a distinction between methods of retaining control
over a defendant's person, not one between seizure and
its opposite.3
This view of the definition and duration of a seizure
comports with common sense and common understand*
ing. A person facing serious criminal charges is hardly
freed from the state's control upon his release from a
police officer's physical grip. He is required to appear
in court at the state's command. He is often subject, as
in this case, to the condition that he seek formal permission from the court (at significant expense) before
exercising what would otherwise be his unquestioned
right to travel outside the jurisdiction. Pending prosecution, his employment prospects may be diminished
severely, he may suffer reputational harm, and he will
experience the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense.
A defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers
greater burdens. That difference, however, should not
lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial
is not still "seized" in the constitutionally relevant sense.
Such a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he remains
apprehended, arrested in his movements, indeed "seized"
for trial, so long as he is bound to appear in court and
answer the state's charges. He is equally bound to
appear, and is hence "seized" for trial, when the state
employs the less strong-arm means of a summons in lieu
of arrest to secure his presence in court.4

8
Such a concern might have stemmed from Seventh Circuit precedent
set before Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989). See Wilkins v. May,
872 F. 2d 190, 192-195 (1989) (substantive due process "shock the
conscience" standard, not Fourth Amendment, applies to brutal "postarrest pre-charge" interrogation).
3
For other purposes, e. g., to determine the proper place for condemnation trials, "seizure" traditionally had a time- and site-specific meaning.
See Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457,471 (1874) ("seizure [of a sloop]
is a single act"; "[possession, which follows seizure, is continuous").
4
On the summons-and-complaint alternative to custodial arrest,
see 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 432-436 (2d ed. 1987).
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This conception of a seizure and its course recognizes
that the vitality of the Fourth Amendment depends upon
its constant observance by police officers. For Oliver,
the Fourth Amendment governed both the manner of,
and the cause for arresting Albright. If Oliver gave
misleading testimony at the preliminary hearing, that
testimony served to maintain and reinforce the unlawful
haling of Albright into court, and so perpetuated the
Fourth Amendment violation.5
A second reason for Albright's decision not to pursue
a Fourth Amendment claim concerns the statute of
limitations. The Court of Appeals suggested in dictum
that any Fourth Amendment claim Albright might have
had accrued on the date of his arrest, and that the
applicable two-year limitations period expired before the
complaint was filed.6 975 F. 2d, at 345. Albright
expressed his acquiescence in this view at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13, 20-21.
Once it is recognized, however, that Albright remained
effectively "seized" for trial so long as the prosecution
against him remained pending, and that Oliver's testimony at the preliminary hearing, if deliberately misleading, violated the Fourth Amendment by perpetuating the
seizure, then the limitations period should have a
different trigger. The time to file the §1983 action
should begin to run not at the start, but at the end of
the episode in suit, i.e., upon dismissal of the criminal
charges against Albright. See McCune v. Grand Rapids,
842 F. 2d 903, 908 (CA6 1988) (Guy, J., concurring in
result) ("Where . . . innocence is what makes the state
action wrongful, it makes little sense to require a
federal suit to be filed until innocence or its equivalent
is established by the termination of the state procedures
in a manner favorable to the state criminal defendant.").
In sum, Albright's Fourth Amendment claim, asserted
within the requisite period after dismissal of the criminal action, in my judgment was neither substantively
deficient nor inevitably time-barred. It was, however, a
claim Albright abandoned in the District Court and did
not attempt to reassert in this Court. The principle of
party presentation cautions decisionmakers against
asserting it for him. See ante, at 8.
* * *
'Albright's reliance on a "malicious prosecution* theory, rather than
a Fourth Amendment theory, is anomalous. The principal player in
carrying out a prosecution—in "the formal commencement of a criminal
proceeding," see post, at 5 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)—is not police officer
but prosecutor. Prosecutors, however, have absolute immunity for their
conduct See Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S.
,
(1991) (slip op., at
7-12). Under Albright's substantive due process theory, the star player
is exonerated, but the supporting actor is not.
In fact, Albright's theory might succeed in exonerating the supporting
actor as well. By focusing on the police officer's role in initiating and
pursuing a criminal prosecution, rather than his role in effectuating and
maintaining a seizure, Albright's theory raises serious questions about
whether the police officer would be entitled to share the prosecutor's
absolute immunity. See post, at 19, n. 26 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)
(noting that the issue is open); ef. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 326
(1933) (holding that § 1983 does not "authoriz[e] a convicted person to
assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured
testimony at his criminal trial"). A right to sue someone who is
absolutely immune from suit would hardly be a right worth pursuing.
*In $ 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state statute of limitations governing actions for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U. S. 261, 276-280 (1985). The question when the limitations
period begins to run, however, is one of federal law. See id., at
268-271; see generally Connors v. Hallmark 6 Son Coal Co., 935 F.
2d 336, 341 (CADC 1991) (collecting cases).
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In Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), this Court
refused to analyze under a "substantive due process"
heading an individual's right to be free from police
applications of excessive force. "Because the Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against this sort of . . . governmental conduct," we said, "that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of 'substantive due process/
must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Id., at
395. I conclude that the Fourth Amendment similarly
proscribes the police misconduct Albright alleges. I
therefore resist in this case the plea "to break new
ground," see Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S.
,
(1992) (slip op., at 9), in a field—substantive due
process—that "has at times been a treacherous [one] for
this Court." See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S.
494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.).
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that an allegation of arrest
without probable cause must be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment without reference to more general
considerations of due process. But I write because Albright's due process claim concerns not his arrest but instead the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution against him.

I
The State must, of course, comply with the constitutional requirements of due process before it convicts and
sentences a person who has violated state law. The initial question here is whether the due process requirements for criminal proceedings include a standard for
the initiation of a prosecution.
The specific provisions of the Bill of Rights neither impose a standard for the initiation of a prosecution, see
Amdts. 5, 6, nor require a pretrial hearing to weigh evidence according to a given standard, see Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975) ("[A] judicial hearing is
not prerequisite to prosecution"); Costello v. United
States, 350 U. S. 359, 363 (1956) ("An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury,
like an information drawn by the prosecutor, . . . is
enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The
Fifth Amendment requires nothing more"). Instead, the
Bill of Rights requires a grand jury indictment and a
speedy trial where a petit jury can determine whether
the charges are true. Amdts. 5, 6.
lb be sure, we have held that a criminal rule or
procedure that does not contravene one of the more
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights may nonetheless
violate the Due Process Clause if it "offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Medina v. California, 505 U. S.
(1992) (slip
op., at 8) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S.
197, 202 (1977)). With respect to the initiation of
charges, however, the specific guarantees contained in
the Bill of Rights mirror the traditional requirements of
the criminal process. The common law provided for a
grand jury indictment and a speedy trial; it did not
provide a specific evidentiary standard applicable to a
pretrial hearing on the merits of the charges or subject
to later review by the courts. See United States v. Williams, 503 U. S.
(1992) (slip op., at 17-18); Costello,
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supra, at 362-363; United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas.
727, 738 (CC NDNY 1852) (Nelson, J.) ("No case has
been cited, nor have we been able to find any, furnishing an authority for looking into and revising the
judgment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the
purpose of determining whether or not the finding was
founded upon sufficient proof).
Moreover, because the Constitution requires a speedy
trial but no pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the
charges (leaving aside the question of extended pretrial
detention, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U. S. 44 (1991)), any standard governing the initiation
of charges would be superfluous in providing protection
during the criminal process. If the charges are not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, the charges
are dismissed; if the charges are proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial, any standard applicable to the
initiation of charges is irrelevant because it is perforce
met. This case thus differs in kind from In re Winship,
397 U. S. 358 (1970), and the other criminal cases
where we have recognized due process requirements not
specified in the Bill of Rights. The constitutional
requirements we enforced in those cases ensured
fundamental fairness in the determination of guilt at
trial. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112
(1935) (due process prohibits "deliberate deception of
court and jury" by prosecution's knowing use of perjured
testimony); ante, at 7, n. 6.
In sum, the due process requirements for criminal proceedings do not include a standard for the initiation of
a criminal prosecution.
II
That may not be the end of the due process inquiry,
however. The common law of torts long recognized that
a malicious prosecution, like a defamatory statement,
can cause unjustified torment and anguish—both by
tarnishing one's name and by costing the accused money
in legal fees and the like. See generally W. Keeton,
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Tbrts §119, pp. 870-889 (5th ed. 1984);
T. Cooley, Law of Torts 180-187 (1879). We have held,
of course, that the Due Process Clause protects interests
other than the interest in freedom from physical restraint, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 121
(1989), and for purposes of this case, we can assume
arguendo that some of the interests granted historical
protection by the common law of torts (such as the interests in freedom from defamation and malicious prosecution) are protected by the Due Process Clause. Even
so, our precedents make clear that a state actor's
random and unauthorized deprivation of that interest
cannot be challenged under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 so long as
the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 535-544 (1981); see
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 531-536 (1984);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674-682 (1977); id.,
at 701 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("adequate state remedy
for defamation may satisfy the due process requirement
when a State has impaired an individual's interest in
his reputation").
The commonsense teaching of Parratt is that some
questions of property, contract, and tort law are best
resolved by state legal systems without resort to the
federal courts, even when a state actor is the alleged
wrongdoer. As we explained in Parratt, the contrary approach "would almost necessarily result in turning every
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alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a state
official acting under 'color of law' into a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under §1983. . . .
Presumably, under this rationale any party who is involved in nothing more than an automobile accident with
a state official could allege a constitutional violation
under § 1983. Such reasoning 'would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed
upon whatever systems may already be administered by
the States.*" 451 U. S., at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis,
424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976)). The Parratt principle respects the delicate balance between state and federal
courts and comports with the design of § 1983, a statute
that reinforces a legal tradition in which protection for
persons and their rights is afforded by the common law
and the laws of the States, as well as by the Constitution. See Parratt, supra, at 531-532.
Yet it is fair to say that courts, including our own,
have been cautious in invoking the rule of Parratt. See
Mann v. Tucson, 782 F. 2d 790, 798 (CA9 1986) (Sneed,
J., concurring). That hesitancy is in part a recognition
of the important role federal courts have assumed in
elaborating vital constitutional guarantees against
arbitrary or oppressive state action. We want to leave
an avenue open for recourse where we think the federal
power ought to be vindicated. Cf. Screws v. United
States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
But the price of our ambivalence over the outer limits
of Parratt has been its dilution and, in some respects,
its transformation into a mere pleading exercise. The
Parratt rule has been avoided by attaching a substantive
rather than procedural label to due process claims (a
distinction that if accepted in this context could render
Parratt a dead letter) and by treating claims based on
the Due Process Clause as claims based on some other
constitutional provision. See Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F. 2d
803, 807 (CA9 1989) (Sneed, J., concurring). It has been
avoided at the other end of the spectrum by construing
complaints alleging a substantive injury as attacks on
the adequacy of state procedures. See Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 139-151 (1990) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F. 2d 1387, 1408
(CA7 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). These evasions
are unjustified given the clarity of the Parratt rule: In
the ordinary case where an injury has been caused not
by a state law, policy, or procedure, but by a random
and unauthorized act that can be remedied by state law,
there is no basis for intervention under §1983, at least
in a suit based on "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter.n 451 U. S., at 536.
As Parratt's precedential force must be acknowledged,
I think it disposes of this case. Illinois provides a tort
remedy for malicious prosecution; indeed, Albright
brought a state law malicious prosecution claim, albeit
after the statute of limitations had expired. (That fact
does not affect the adequacy of the remedy under Parratt. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 342 (1986)
(STEVENS, J., concurring).) Given the state remedy and
the holding of Parratt, there is neither need nor legitimacy in invoking §1983 in this case. See 975 F. 2d
343, 347 (CA7 1992).
Ill
That said, if a State did not provide a tort remedy for
malicious prosecution, there would be force to the argument that the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal
prosecution infringes an interest protected by the Due
1-26-94

Process Clause and enforceable under § 1983. Compare
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 676, id., at 701-702
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573 (1972), with Paul v.
Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 711-712 (1976); see PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 93-94 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Martinez v. California, 444
U. S. 277, 281-282 (1980); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, 134 (1877). But given the state tort remedy, we
need not conduct that inquiry in this case.
• • *

For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the
Court holding that the dismissal of petitioner Albright's
complaint was proper.
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in the judgment.
While I agree with the Court's judgment that petitioner has not justified recognition of a substantive due
process violation in his prosecution without probable
cause, I reach that result by a route different from that
of the plurality. The Court has previously rejected the
proposition that the Constitution's application to a
general subject (like prosecution) is necessarily exhausted by protection under particular textual guarantees addressing specific events within that subject (like
search and seizure), on a theory that one specific
constitutional provision can pre-empt a broad field as
against another more general one. See United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S.
,
(1993) (slip op., at 5) ("We have rejected the view that
the applicability of one constitutional amendment preempts the guarantees of another"); Soldal v. Cook
County, 506 U. S.
,
(1992) (slip op., at 14)
("Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and,
accordingly, can implicate more than one of the
Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying
as a preliminary matter the claim's 'dominant' character.
Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in
turn"). It has likewise rejected the view that incorporation of the substantive guarantees of the first eight
amendments of the Constitution defines the limits of due
process protection, see Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46, 89-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The second
Justice Harlan put it this way:
"[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause . . . is not a series of isolated
points . . . .
It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints . . . ." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543
(1961) (dissenting opinion).
We are, nonetheless, required by *[t]he doctrine of
judicial self-restraint . . . to exercise the utmost care
whenever we are asked to break new ground in [the]
field" of substantive due process. Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U. S.
,
(1992) (slip op., at 9). Just
as the concept of due process does not protect against
insubstantial impositions on liberty, neither should the
"rational continuum" be reduced to the mere duplication
of protections adequately addressed by other constitutional provisions. Justice Harlan could not infer that
the due process guarantee was meant to protect against
insubstantial burdens, and we are not free to infer that
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it was meant to be applied without thereby adding a
substantial increment to protection otherwise available.
The importance of recognizing the latter limitation is
underscored by pragmatic concerns about subjecting
government actors to two (potentially inconsistent)
standards for the same conduct and needlessly imposing
on trial courts the unenviable burden of reconciling wellestablished jurisprudence under the Fourth and Eighth
Amendments with the ill-defined contours of some novel
due process right.1
This rule of reserving due process for otherwise
homeless substantial claims no doubt informs those
decisions, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989),
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), and Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 327 (1986), in which the Court
has resisted against relying on the Due Process Clause
when doing so would have duplicated protection that a
more specific constitutional provision already bestowed.2
This case calls for just such restraint, in presenting no
substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth
Amendment is generally thought to redress already.
In framing his claim of infringement of a liberty
interest in freedom from the initiation of a baseless
prosecution, petitioner has chosen to disclaim any
reliance on the Fourth Amendment seizure that followed
when he surrendered himself into police custody.
Petitioner has failed, however, to allege any substantial
'JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that these concerns are not for this
Court, since Congress resolved them in deciding to provide a remedy
for constitutional violations under §1983. Post, at 22-23. The question before the Court, however, is not about the existence of a
statutory remedy for an admitted constitutional violation, but
whether a particular violation of substantive due process, as distinct
from the Fourth Amendment, should be recognized on the facts
pleaded. This question is indisputably within the province of the
Court, and should be addressed with regard for the concerns about
unnecessary duplication in constitutional adjudication reflected in
Graham, Gerstein, and Whitley. Nothing in Congress's enactment of
§1983 suggests otherwise.
8
Recognizing these concerns makes sense of what at first blush
may seem a tension between our decisions in Graham v. Connor,
490 U. S. 386 (1989), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), on
the one hand, and United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S.
(1993), and Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S.
(1992), on the other. The Court held in Graham that all claims of
excessive force by law enforcement officials in the course of a
"seizure" should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard. "Because the Fourth Amendment provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment,
not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be
the guide to analyzing these claims." Graham v. Connor, supra, at
395. The Gerstein Court held that the Fourth Amendment, not the
Due Process Clause, determines what post-arrest proceedings are required for suspects detained on criminal charges. Gerstein v. Pugh,
supra. As we recently explained in United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, supra, at
(slip op., at 6), the Court reasoned in Gerstein that the Fourth Amendment "balance between individual and public interests always has been thought to define the
'process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal
cases." See Gerstein, supra, at 125, n. 27. Thus, in both Gerstein
and Graham, separate analysis under the Due Process Clause was
dispensed with as redundant The Court has reached the same result in the context of claims of unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain in penal institutions. See Whitley v. Albert, 475 U. S. 312, 327
(1986) ("It would indeed be surprising if . . . 'conduct that shocks
the conscience' or 'afTord[s] brutality the cloak of law,' and so violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S.
165, 172, 173 (1952), were not also punishment Inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency' and Yepugnant to the conscience
of mankind,' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S., at 103, 106, in violation
of the Eighth").
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injury that is attributable to the former event, but not
the latter. His complaint presents an extensive list of
damages: limitations on his liberty, freedom of association, and freedom of movement by virtue of the terms of
his bond; financial expense of his legal defense; reputational harm among members of the community; inability
to transact business or obtain employment in his local
area, necessitating relocation to St. Louis; inability to
secure credit; and personal pain and suffering. See App.
to Pet. for Cert. 49a-50a. None of these injuries,
however, is alleged to have followed from the issuance
of the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from
the ensuing assertion of custody. Thus, petitioner has
not shown a substantial deprivation of liberty from the
mere initiation of prosecution.
The significance of this failure follows from the
recognition that none of petitioner's alleged injuries has
been treated by the Courts of Appeals as beyond the
ambit of compensability under the general rule of 42
U. S. C. § 1983 liability for a seizure unlawful under
Fourth Amendment standards, see Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U. S. 1 (1985) (affirming §1983 liability based on
Fourth Amendment violation); Brower v. County ofInyo,
489 U. S. 593, 599 (1989) (unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to § 1983
liability). On the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have
held that injuries like those petitioner alleges are
cognizable in §1983 claims founded upon arrests that
are bad under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Hale
v. Fish, 899 F. 2d 390, 403-404 (CA5 1990) (affirming
award of damages for mental anguish, harm to reputation, and legal fees for defense); B. C. R. Transport Co.,
Inc. v. Fontaine, 727 F. 2d 7, 12 (CA1 1984) (affirming
award of damages for destruction of business due to
publicity surrounding illegal search); Sims v. Mulcahy,
902 F. 2d 524, 532-533 (CA7 1990) (approving damages
for pain, suffering, and mental anguish in the context of
a challenge to jury instructions); Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846
F. 2d 953, 959 (CA4 1988) (affirming damages for
extreme emotional distress); Dennis v. Warren, 779 F. 2d
245, 248-249 (CA5 1985) (affirming award of damages
for pain, suffering, humiliation, and embarrassment);
Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F. 2d 13, 17 (CA7 1979) (affirming damages for lost wages, mental distress, humiliation,
loss of reputation, and general pain and suffering).
Indeed, it is not surprising that rules of recovery for
such harms have naturally coalesced under the Fourth
Amendment, since the injuries usually occur only after
an arrest or other Fourth Amendment seizure, an event
that normally follows promptly (3 days in this case)
upon the formality of filing an indictment, information,
or complaint. There is no restraint on movement until
a seizure occurs or bond terms are imposed. Damage to
reputation and all of its attendant harms also tend to
show up after arrest. The defendant's mental anguish
(whether premised on reputational harm, burden of
defending, incarceration, or some other consequence of
prosecution) customarily will not arise before an arrest,
or at least before the notification that an arrest warrant
has been issued informs him of the charges.
There may indeed be exceptional cases where some
quantum of harm occurs in the interim period after
groundless criminal charges are filed but before any
Fourth Amendment seizure. Whether any such unusual
case may reveal a substantial deprivation of liberty, and
so justify a court in resting compensation on a want of
government power or a limitation of it independent of
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the Fourth Amendment, are issues to be faced only
when they arise. They do not arise in this case and I
accordingly concur in the judgment of the Court.5
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN
joins, dissenting.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution constrains
the power of the Federal Government to accuse a citizen
of an infamous crime. Under that Amendment, no
accusation may issue except on a grand jury determination that there is probable cause to support the accusation.1 The question presented by this case is whether
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes any comparable constraint on state governments.
In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), we
decided that the Due Process Clause does not compel the
States to proceed by way of grand jury indictment when
they initiate a prosecution. In reaching that conclusion,
however, we noted that the substance of the federal
guarantee was preserved by California's requirement
that a magistrate certify "to the probable guilt of the
defendant." Id., at 538. In accord with Hurtado, I
would hold that Illinois may dispense with the grand
jury procedure only if the substance of the probablecause requirement remains adequately protected.2

I
Assuming, as we must, that the allegations of
petitioner's complaint are true, it is perfectly clear that
the probable-cause requirement was not satisfied in this
case. Indeed, it is plain that respondent Oliver, who
attested to the criminal information against petitioner,
either knew or should have known that he did not have
probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings.
Oliver's only evidence against petitioner came from a
paid informant who established her unreliability on more
than 50 occasions, when her false accusations led to
aborted and dismissed prosecutions.9 Nothing about her
•JUSTICE STEVENS argues that the fact that few of petitioner's
injuries flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him does
not make those injuries insubstantial," post, at 23, n. 29 (emphasis
in original), and maintains that the arbitrary filing of criminal
charges may work substantial harm on liberty. Ibid. While I do
not quarrel with either proposition, neither of them addresses the
threshold question whether the complaint alleges any substantial
deprivation beyond the scope of what settled law recognizes at the
present time.
'"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger, . . . . " U. S. Const,
Amdt. 5. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 343 (1974).
*In Hurtado, 110 U. S., at 532, the Court made this comment on the
traditions inherited from English law, with particular reference to the
Magna Charta:
"Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and
tyranny, here they have become bulwarks also against arbitrary
legislation; but, in that application, as it would be incongruous to
measure and restrict them by the ancient customary English law, they
must be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very
substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property.
\ . . Such regulations, to adopt a sentence of Burke's, 'may alter the
mode and application but have no power over the substance of original
justice.'"
'According to the complaint, Oliver, a detective in the Macomb,
Illinois, Police Department, agreed to provide Veda Moore with
protection and money in exchange for her assistance in acting as a
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performance in this case suggested any improvement on
her record. The substance she described as cocaine
turned out to be baking soda. She twice misidentified
her alleged vendor before, in response to a leading
question, she agreed that petitioner might be he;4 in
fact, she had never had any contact with petitioner. As
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the commencement of a serious criminal proceeding on such "scanty
grounds" was nothing short of "shocking."5
These shocking factual allegations give rise to two
important questions of law: does the commencement of
formal criminal proceedings deprive the accused person
of liberty" as that term is used in the Fourteenth
Amendment; and, if so, are the demands of "due process"
satisfied solely by compliance with certain procedural
formalities which ordinarily ensure that a prosecution
will not commence absent probable cause? I shall
discuss these questions separately, and then comment on
the several opinions supporting the Court's judgment.
II
Punishment by confinement in prison is a frequent
conclusion of criminal proceedings. Had petitioner's
prosecution resulted in his conviction and incarceration,
then there is no question but that the Due Process
Clause would have been implicated; a central purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to deny States the
power to impose this sort of deprivation of liberty until
after completion of a fair trial. Over the years, however,
our cases have made it clear that the interests protected
by the Due Process Clause extend well beyond freedom
from an improper criminal conviction.
As a qualitative matter, we have decided that the
liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is significantly broader than mere freedom from physical constraint. Although its contours have never been defined
confidential informant. Allegedly, Moore, addicted to cocaine, lied to
Oliver about her undercover purchases of controlled substances in order
to receive the promised payment*. During the course of her tenure as an
informant, Moore falsely implicated over 50 individuals in criminal
activity, resulting each time in a dismissed prosecution.
4
Relying entirely on information provided by Moore, Oliver testified
before a grand jury and secured an indictment against a first suspect,
John Albright, Jr., for selling a "look alike" substance in violation of
Illinois law. When he attempted to arrest John Albright, Jr., however,
Oliver became convinced that he had the wrong man, and substituted the
name of a second suspect, Albright's son, on the arrest warrant Once
again, it became clear that Oliver's suspect could not have committed the
crime. Oliver then asked Moore whether her vendor might have been a
different son of the man she had first identified. When Moore admitted
of that possibility, Oliver attested to the criminal information charging
petitioner, his third and final suspect, with a felony.
8
"Detective Oliver made no effort to corroborate Veda Moore's
unsubstantiated accusation. Aheap of baking soda was no corroboration.
Her initial misidentification of the seller cast grave doubt on the
accuracy of her information. And this was part of a pattern: of fifty
persons she reported to Oliver as trafficking in drugs, none was
successfully prosecuted for any crime. In the case of 'Albright/ Oliver
should have suspected that Moore had bought cocaine either from she
knew not whom orfromsomeone she was afraid to snitch on (remember
that she had gone to work for Oliver in the first place because she was
being threatened by a man to whom she owed money for previous
purchases of cocaine), that she had consumed it and replaced it with
baking soda, and that she had then picked a name from the phone book
at random. The fact that she used her informant's reward to buy cocaine
makes this hypothesis all the more plausible. An arrest is a serious
business. To arrest a person on the scanty grounds that are alleged to
be all that Oliver had to go on is shocking." 975 F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7
1992).
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precisely, that liberty surely includes the right to make
basic decisions about the future; to participate in
community affairs; to take advantage of employment
opportunities; to cultivate family, business, and social
relationships; and to travel from place to place.0 On a
quantitative level, we have, to be sure, acknowledged
that not every modest impairment of individual liberty
amounts to a deprivation raising constitutional concerns.
Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976). At the
same time, however, we have recognized that a variety
of state actions have such serious effects on protected
liberty interests that they may not be undertaken
arbitrarily, 7 or without observing procedural
safeguards.9
In my opinion, the formal commencement of a criminal
proceeding is quintessentially this type of state action.
The initiation of a criminal prosecution, regardless of
whether it prompts an arrest, immediately produces a a
wrenching disruption of everyday life." Young v. United
States ex reL Vuitton et Fils, 481 U. S. 787, 814 (1987).
Every prosecution, like every arrest, "is a public act that
may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty,
whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt
his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create
anxiety in him, his family and his friends." United
States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 320 (1971). In short,
an official accusation of serious crime has a direct
impact on a range of identified liberty interests. That
impact, moreover, is of sufficient magnitude to qualify as
a deprivation of liberty meriting constitutional protection.9
'As we stated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923):
"While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt,
it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.* Id, at 399 (citations omitted).
T
See, e,g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94-99 (1987) (invalidating
prison regulation of inmate marriages); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U. S. 494, 500 (1977) (striking down ordinance that prohibited certain
relatives from residing together because it had only a "tenuous relation*
to its goals); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952) (requiring
loyalty oaths of public employees violates due process because
"[ijindiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must
fall as an assertion of arbitrary power"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925) (state law requiring parents to send children
to public school violates due process because "rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State*).
'See, a,*., Cleveland Bd of Ed v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542
(1985) ("An essentia] principle of due process is that a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property t>e preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case'*) (quoting Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Ca, 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950)); Goes v. Lopez, 419
U. S. 565, 581 (1975) (TDJue process requires, in connection with a
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation
of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present hit
side of the story"); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 436-437
(1971) ("Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is
at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential").
*The Court of Appeals was persuaded that the Court's reasoning in
Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), required a different conclusion. 975
F. 2d, at 345. Even if one accepts the dubious proposition that an
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Ill
The next question, of course, is what measure of "due
process" must be provided an accused in connection with
this deprivation of liberty. In In re Winship, 397 U. S.
358, 361-364 (1970), we relied on both history and
certain societal interests to find that, in the context of
criminal conviction, due process entails proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The same considerations
support a requirement that criminal prosecution be
predicated, at a minimum, on a rinding of probable
cause.
It has been the historical practice in our jurisprudence
to withhold the filing of criminal charges until the state
can marshal evidence establishing probable cause that
an identifiable defendant has committed a crime. This
long tradition is reflected in the common law tort of
malicious prosecution,10 as well as in our cases.11 In
addition, the probable cause requirement serves valuable
societal interests, protecting the populace from the whim
and caprice of governmental agents without unduly
burdening the government's prosecutorial function.12
Consistent with our reasoning in Winship, these factors
lead to the conclusion that one element of the "due
process" prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment is a
responsible decision that there is probable cause to
prosecute.13
Illinois has established procedures intended to ensure
that evidence of "the probable guilt of the defendant,"
see Hurtado, 110 U. S., at 538, has been assembled
before a criminal prosecution is pursued.14 Petitioner
individual's interest in his or her reputation simpliciier is not an interest
in liberty, Paul v. Davis recognized that liberty is infringed by govern*
mental conduct that injures reputation in conjunction with other
interests. 424 U. S., at 701. The commencement of a criminal prosecution is certainly such conduct.
10
See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and
Keeton on Law of Torts § 119 pp. 876-882 (5th ed. 1984).
11
Wayie v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607 (1985); Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely
in his discretion"); GersUin v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975) ("The
standard of proof required of the prosecution is usually referred to as
'probable cause/ but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie
case of guilt"); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 791
(1977) (noting that "it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to
recommend an indictment on less than probable cause") (footnote
omitted); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 343 (1974) (noting
that one of the "grand jury's historic functions" was to determine
whether probable cause existed); Dins man v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390, 402
(1852) (noting that instigation of a criminal prosecution without probable
cause creates an action for malicious prosecution).
"Because probable cause is already required for an arrest, and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction, the burden on law enforcement is not appreciably enhanced by a requirement of probable cause for
prosecution.
19
1 thus disagree with dicta to the contrary in a footnote in Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U. S., at 125, n. 26 ("Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is
required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other
than the condition that they appear for trial"). As I have explained, the
commencement of criminal proceedings itself infringes on liberty
interests, regardless of the restraints imposed.
14
At the time of this suit, Illinois law allowed the filing of felony
charges only by information or indictment. El, Rev. Stat., Ch. 38,
§ lll-2(a) (1987). If the filing were by information, as was the case here,
then the charges could be filed but not pursued until a preliminary
hearing had been held or waived pursuant to Ch. 38, § 109-3, and, if
held, had concluded in a finding of probable cause to believe that the
defendant had committed an offense. Ch. 38, §§ 111-2U), $ 109-3.

54 CrL 2090

does not challenge the general adequacy of these
procedures. Rather, he claims that the probable cause
determination in his case was invalid as a substantive
matter, because it was wholly unsupported by reliable
evidence and tainted by Oliver's disregard or suppression
of facts bearing on the reliability of his informant. This
contention requires us to consider whether a state's
compliance with facially valid procedures for initiating
a prosecution is by itself sufficient to meet the demands
of due process, without regard to the substance of the
resulting probable cause determination.
Fortunately, our prior cases have rejected such a
formalistic approach to the Due Process Clause. In
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 110 (1935), a criminal defendant claimed that the prosecutor's knowing use
of perjured testimony, and deliberate suppression of
evidence that would have impeached that testimony,
constituted a denial of due process. The State urged us
to reject this submission on the ground that the
petitioner's trial had been free of procedural error. Our
treatment of the State's argument should dispose of the
analogous defense advanced today:
"Without attempting at this time to deal with the
question at length, we deem it sufficient for the
present purpose to say that we are unable to
approve this narrow view of the requirement of due
process. That requirement, in safeguarding the
liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the
action of the State, embodies the fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our
civil and political institutions. Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 U. S. 312, 316, 317 [1926]. It is a requirement
that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice
and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction
through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but
used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by
the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.
Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is
the obtaining of a like result by intimidation." Id.,
at 112.
In the years since Mooney, we have consistently reaffirmed this understanding of the requirements of due
process. Our cases make clear that procedural regularity notwithstanding, the Due Process Clause is violated
by the knowing use of perjured testimony or the deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.15
It is, in other words, well established that adherence to
procedural forms will not save a conviction that rests in
substance on false evidence or deliberate deception.
u
See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 103, and n. 8 (1976)
(citing cases); Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153-154 (1972)
(failure to disclose Government agreement with witness violates due
process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83,87 (1963) ("suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959) (failure of state to correct testimony known
to be false violates due process); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 215-216
(1942) (allegations of the knowing use of perjured testimony and the
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused "sufficiently charge a
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if
proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present custody*).
But cf. United States v. Williams, 504 U. S.
(1992) (prosecutor need
not present exculpatory evidence in his possession to the grand jury).
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Just as perjured testimony may invalidate an otherwise proper conviction, so also may the absence of proof
render a criminal conviction unconstitutional. The
traditional assumption that "proof of a criminal charge
beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required,"
Winship, 397 U. S., at 362, has been endorsed explicitly,
and tied directly to the Due Process Clause. Id., at
364.16 When the quantum of proof supporting a conviction falls sufficiently far below this standard, then the
Due Process Clause requires that the conviction be set
aside, even in the absence of any procedural error.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979).
In short, we have already recognized that certain
substantive defects can vitiate the protection ordinarily
afforded by a trial, so that formal compliance with
procedural rules is no longer enough to satisfy the
demands of due process. The same is true of a facially
valid determination of probable cause. Even if prescribed procedures are followed meticulously, a criminal
prosecution based on perjured testimony, or evidence on
which "no rational trier of fact" could base a finding of
probable cause, cf. id., at 324, simply does not comport
with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.

IV
I do not understand the plurality to take issue with
the proposition that commencement of a criminal case
deprives the accused of liberty, or that the state has a
duty to make a probable cause determination before
filing charges. Instead, both the CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE SCALIA identify petitioner's reliance on a
"substantive due process" theory as the critical flaw in
his argument. Because there is no substantive due
process right available to petitioner, they conclude, his
due process claim can be rejected in its entirety and
without further consideration.
In my opinion, this approach places undue weight on
the label petitioner has attached to his claim.17 The
Fourteenth Amendment contains only one Due Process
Clause. Though it is sometimes helpful, as a matter of
doctrine, to distinguish between substantive and procedural due process, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S.
327, 337-340 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments), the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, and
their protections often overlap.
Indeed, the Fourth Amendment, upon which the
plurality principally relies, provides both procedural and
substantive protections, and these protections converge.
When the Court first held that the right to be free from
unreasonable official searches was "implicit in 'the
concept of ordered liberty,'" and therefore protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27-28 (1949), it refused
to require the States to provide the procedures accorded

""Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.* In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364.
17
In any event, it should be noted that in presenting his question for
review, petitioner invokes the Due Process Clause generally, without
reference to "substantive* due process. See P e t for Cert i.
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in federal trials to protect that right.18 Id., at 28-33.
Significantly, however, when we overruled the procedural
component of that decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.
643 (1961), we made it clear that we were "extending
the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or federal . . . "
Id., at 655 (emphasis added).
Moreover, in Winship, we found it unnecessary to
clarify whether our holding rested on substantive or
procedural due process grounds; it was enough to say
that the "Due Process Clause" itself requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 397 U. S., at 364. Similarly, whether the analogous probable cause standard
urged by petitioner is more appropriately characterized
as substantive or procedural is not a matter of overriding significance. In either event, the same Due Process
Clause operates to protect the individual against the
abuse of governmental power, by guaranteeing that no
criminal prosecution shall be initiated except on a
finding of probable cause.
V
According to the plurality, the application of certain
portions of the Bill of Rights to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment "has substituted, in these areas
of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the
various provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . for the more
generalized language contained in the earlier cases
construing the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante, at 6-7.
The plurality then reasons, in purported reliance on
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), that because
the Fourth Amendment is designed to address pretrial
deprivations of liberty, petitioner's claim must be
analyzed under that Amendment alone. Ante, at 7. In
the end, however, the CHIEF JUSTICE concludes that he
need not consider petitioner's claim under the Fourth
Amendment after all, because that question was not
presented in the petition for certiorari. Ante, at 8.
There are two glaring flaws in the plurality's analysis.
First, the pretrial deprivation of liberty at issue in this
case is addressed by a particular amendment, but not
the Fourth; rather, it is addressed by the Grand Jury
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That the Framers saw
fit to provide a specific procedural guarantee against
arbitrary accusations indicates the importance they
attached to the liberty interest at stake. Though we
have not required the States to use the grand jury
procedure itself, it by no means follows that the underlying liberty interest is unworthy of Fourteenth Amendment protection. As we explained in Hurtado, "bulwarks* of protection such as the Magna Charta and the
Due Process Clause "guarantee not particular forms of
procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to
life, liberty, and property."1*
Second, and of greater importance, the cramped view
of the Fourteenth Amendment taken by the plurality has
been rejected time and time again by this Court. In his
famous dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332
U. S. 46, 89-92 (1947), Justice Black took the position
'•Our refusal in Wolf io require States to adopt a federal rule of
procedure—the exclusionary rule—paralleled our earlier refusal in
Hurtado to require States to adopt a federal rule of procedure—the
grand jury process for ascertaining probable cause. Nevertheless,
both cases recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the
substantive rights as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
M
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 532 (1884). See n. 2, supra.
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that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the
States. As a corollary, he advanced a theory not unlike
that endorsed today by the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
SCALIA: that the express guarantees of the Bill of
Rights mark the outer limit of Due Process Clause
protection. Ibid. What is critical, for present purposes,
is that the Adamson majority rejected this contention,
and held instead that the "ordered liberty'' protected by
the Due Process Clause is not coextensive with the
specific provisions of the first eight Amendments to the
Constitution. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence made
this point perfectly clear:
"It may not be amiss to restate the pervasive
function of the Fourteenth Amendment in exacting
from the States observance of basic liberties. . . .
The Amendment neither comprehends the specific
provisions by which the founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the federal government nor is it
confined to them. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has an independent potency
" Id., at 66.
In the years since Adamson, the Court has shown no
inclination to reconsider its repudiation of Justice
Black's position.30 Instead, the Court has identified
numerous violations of due process that have no counterparts in the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
And contrary to the suggestion of the plurality, ante, at
5, 7, these decisions have not been limited to the realm
outside criminal law. As I have already discussed, it is
the Due Process Clause itself, and not some explicit
provision of the Bill of Rights, that forbids the use of
perjured testimony and the suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused.21 Similarly, we have held
that the Due Process Clause requires an impartial
judge,22 and prohibits the use of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures.23 Characteristically,
Justice Black was the sole dissenter when the Court
concluded in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966),
that the failure to control disruptive influences in the
courtroom constitutes a denial of due process.
Perhaps most important, and virtually ignored by the
plurality today, is our holding in In re Winship that "the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 397
U. S., at 364. Because the reasonable-doubt standard
has no explicit textual source in the Bill of Rights, the
Winship Court was faced with precisely the same
argument now advanced by the CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE SCALIA: noting the procedural guarantees for
which the Bill of Rights specifically provides in criminal
cases, Justice Black maintained that *[t]he Constitution
thus goes into some detail to spell out what kind of trial
a defendant charged with crime should have, and I
believe the Court has no power to add to or subtract

*° Indeed, no other Justice has joined Justice Black in maintaining that
the scope of the Due Process Clause is limited to the specific guarantees
of the Bill of Rights. Although Justice Douglas joined Justice Black in
dissent in Adamson, he later retreated from this position. See, e,g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law, §11-2 p. 774 and n. 32 (2d ed. 1988).
,l
See n. 15, supra.
"Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927).
"Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (1967). Justice Black dissented.
Id, at 303-306.
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from the procedures set forth by the Founders." Id., at
377 (dissenting opinion). Holding otherwise, the
Winship majority resoundingly rejected this position,
which Justice Harlan characterized as "flfying] in the
face of a course of judicial history reflected in an
unbroken line of opinions that have interpreted due
process to impose restraints on the procedures government may adopt in its dealing with its citizens . . . ."
Id., at 373, n. 5 (concurring opinion).
Nevertheless, the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA
seem intent on resuscitating a theory that has never
been viable, by reading our opinion in Graham v.
Connor more broadly than our actual holding. In
Graham, which involved a claim of excessive force in the
context of an arrest or investigatory stop, we held that
a
[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these
claims." 490 U. S., at 395. Under Graham, then, the
existence of a specific protection in the Bill of Rights
that is incorporated by the Due Process Clause may
preclude what would in any event be redundant reliance
on a more general conception of liberty.24 Nothing in
Graham, however, forecloses a general due process claim
when a more specific source of protection is absent or,
as here, open to question. See ante, at 8 (reserving
question whether Fourth Amendment protects against
filing of charges without probable cause).
At bottom, the plurality opinion seems to rest on one
fundamental misunderstanding: that the incorporation
cases have somehow "substituted" the specific provisions
of the Bill of Rights for the "more generalized language
contained in the earlier cases construing the Fourteenth
Amendment.* Ante, at 7. In fact, the incorporation
cases themselves rely on the very "generalized language"
the CHIEF JUSTICE would have them displacing.25
Those cases add to the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause most of the specific guarantees of the
first eight Amendments, but they do not purport to take
anything away; that a liberty interest is not the subject
of an incorporated provision of the Bill of Rights does
not remove it from the ambit of the Due Process Clause.
I cannot improve on Justice Harlan's statement of this
settled proposition:

*4 Moreover, it likely made no difference to the outcome in Graham that
the Court rested its decision on the Fourth Amendment rather than the
Due Process Clause. The text of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against "unreasonable" seizures is no more specific than the Due Process
Clause's prohibition against deprivations of liberty without "due process."
Under either provision, the appropriate standards for evaluating
excessive force claims must be developed through the same common law
process of case-by-case adjudication.
"See, eg M Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the
exclusionary rule to the States because "without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral... as not to merit
this Court's high regard as afreedom'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that
"the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a
fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145,149 (1968) ("Because we believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice, we hold
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee").
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"ITJhe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by
the preqse terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty* is
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms
of the taking of property; the freedom of speech,
press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms;
the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny
of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.- Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
I have no doubt that an official accusation of an infamous crime constitutes a deprivation of liberty worthy
of constitutional protection. The Framers of the Bill of
Rights so concluded, and there is no reason to believe
that the sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment held a
different view. The Due Process Clause of that Amendment should therefore be construed to require a responsible determination of probable cause before such a
deprivation is effected.
VI
A separate comment on JUSTICE GlNSBURG's opinion is
appropriate. I agree with her explanation of why the
initial seizure of petitioner continued until his discharge
and why the seizure was constitutionally unreasonable.
Had it been conducted by a federal officer, it would have
violated the Fourth Amendment. And, because unreasonable official seizures by state officers are deprivations
of liberty or property without due process of law, the
seizure of petitioner violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, JUSTICE GlNSBURG is correct in concluding
that the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
Having concluded that the complaint states a cause of
action, however, her opinion does not adequately explain
why a dismissal of that complaint should be affirmed.
Her submission, as I understand it, rests on the propositions that (1) petitioner abandoned a meritorious claim
based on the component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment that is coterminous with the
Fourth Amendment; and (2) the Due Process Clause
provides no protection for deprivations of liberty associated with the initiation of a criminal prosecution unless
an unreasonable seizure occurs. For reasons already
stated, I firmly disagree with the second proposition.
In the Bill of Rights, the Framers provided constitutional protection against unfounded felony accusations in
the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
separate protection against unwarranted arrests in the
Fourth Amendment. Quite obviously, they did not
regard the latter protection as sufficient to avoid the
harm associated with an irresponsible official accusation
of serious criminal conduct. Therefore, although in most
cases an arrest or summons to appear in court may
promptly follow the initiation of criminal proceedings,
the accusation itself causes a harm that is analytically,
and often temporally, distinct from the arrest. In this
very case, the petitioner suffered a significant injury
1-26-94

before he voluntarily surrendered.28 In other cases a
significant interval may separate the formal accusation
from the arrest, possibly because the accused is out of
the jurisdiction or because of administrative delays in
effecting the arrest.27
Because the constitutional protection against unfounded
accusations is distinct from, and somewhat broader than,
the protection against unreasonable seizures, there is no
reason why an abandonment of a claim based on the
seizure should constitute a waiver of the claim based on
the accusation. Moreover, a case holding that allegations of police misconduct in connection with an arrest
or seizure are adequately reviewed under the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard, Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), tells us nothing about how
unwarranted accusations should be evaluated.
Graham merely held that the due process right to be
free from police applications of excessive force when
state officers effect a seizure is governed by the same
reasonableness standard as that governing seizures
effected by federal officers. Id., at 394-395. In the
unlawful seizure context exemplified by Graham, there
is no need to differentiate between a so-called Fourth
Amendment theory and a substantive due process theory
because they are coextensive. 28 Whether viewed
through a Fourth Amendment lens or a substantive due
process lens, the substantive right protected is the same.
When, however, the scope of the Fourth Amendment
protection does not fully encompass the liberty interest
at stake—as in this case—it is both unwise and unfair
to place a blinder on the lens that focuses on the
"The petitioner was deprived of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest at the moment that he was formally charged with a
crime—an event that occurred prior to his seizure, and several
months prior to the preliminary hearing. I agree with JUSTICE
GlNSBURG that the officer's incomplete testimony at the preliminary
hearing perpetuated the violation of petitioner's right to be free from
unreasonable seizure, ante, at 4, but it also perpetuated the violation of his right to be free from prosecution absent probable cause.
As such, contrary to her suggestion, ante, at 2, n. 1, either constitutional violation—the prosecution absent probable cause or the
unreasonable seizure—can independently support an action under 42
U. S. C. §1983.
Furthermore, although JUSTICE GlNSBURG speculates that respondent may be fully protected from damages liability by an immunity
defense, ante, at 4-5, n. 5, that issue is neither free of difficulty, cf.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U. S.
(1993), nor properly before
us. See Plurality Opinion, ante, at 2, n. 3. The question on which
we granted certiorari is whether the initiation of criminal charges
absent probable cause is a deprivation of liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause. Neither the fact that the seizure caused by
petitioner's arrest also deprived him of liberty, nor the possible
availability of an affirmative defense, is a sufficient reason for
failing to discuss or decide this question. The question whether one
is protected by the Due Process Clause from unfounded prosecutions
has implications beyond whether damages are ultimately obtainable.
Indeed, in this very case petitioner's complaint sought injunctive
relief in addition to damages.
27
See, e,g.t Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S.
(1992) (time lag
between indictment and arrest of 8Vi years due in part to the
defendant's absence from the country and in part to the
Government's negligence).
M
lt is worthwhile to emphasize that the Fourth Amendment itself
does not apply to state actors. It is only because the Court has
held that the privacy rights protected against federal invasion by
that Amendment are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
that the Fourth Amendment has any relevance in this case. Strictly
speaking, petitioner's claim is based entirely and exclusively on the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
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specific right being asserted. Although history teaches
us that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have been
viewed "as running 'almost into each other/" Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S., at 646, quoting Boyd v. United States,
116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), and citing Entick v.
Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765), we have
never previously thought that the area of overlapping
protection should constrain the independent protection
provided by either.
VII
Although JUSTICE SOUTER leaves open the possibility
that in some future case, a due process claim could be
stated for a prosecution absent probable cause, he
concludes that this is not such a case. He is persuaded
that the federal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations provides an adequate justification for refusing to
•"break new ground*" by recognizing the "novel due
process right" asserted by petitioner. Ante, at 2. Like
the CHIEF JUSTICE, ante, at 5, 8, and JUSTICE GINSBURG,

ante at 6, he points to Collins v. Harker Heights, 503
U. S.
(1992), as a pertinent example of our reluctance "to expand the concept of substantive due process
. . . in [an] unchartered area." Id., at
(slip op., at
9). Our relevant holding in that case was that a city's
failure to provide an employee with a reasonably safe
place to work did not violate the Federal Constitution.
We unanimously characterized the petitioner's constitutional claim as "unprecedented." Id., at
(slip op., at
11). The contrast between Collins and this case could
not be more stark.
The lineage of the constitutional right asserted in this
case dates back to the Magna Charta. See n. 2, supra.
In an early Massachusetts case, Chief Justice Shaw
described it as follows:
"The right of individual citizens to be secure from
an open and public accusation of crime, and from
the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of
high offences, is justly regarded as one of the
securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious,
and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of
the ancient immunities and privileges of English
liberty." Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344
(1857).
Moreover, most of the Courts of Appeals have treated
claims of prosecutions without probable cause as within
"the ambit of compensability under the general rule of
42 U. S. C. §1983 liability," see ante, at 5 (SOUTER, J.,
concurring in judgment). See, e.g., Golino v. New
Haven, 950 F. 2d 864, 866-867 (CA2 1991) (and case
cited therein), cert, denied, 509 U. S.
(1992); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F. 2d 649, 654-657 (CA10 1990)
(citing cases); Torres v. Superintendent of Police of
Puerto Rico, 893 F. 2d 404, 408 (CA1 1990) (citing cases,
and finding cause of action if "egregious"); Goodwin v.
Metts, 885 F. 2d 157, 162 (CA4 1989) (citing cases), cert,
denied, 494 U. S. 1081 (1990); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F. 2d
331, 348-349 (CA3 1989) (citing cases); Strength v.
Hubert, 854 F. 2d 421 (CA11 1988); Wheeler v. Cosden
Oil & Chemical Co., 734 F. 2d 254 (CA5 1984).
Given the abundance of precedent in the Courts of
Appeals, the vintage of the liberty interest at stake, and
the fact that the Fifth Amendment categorically forbids
the Federal Government from initiating a felony prosecu54 CrL 2094

tion without presentment to a grand jury, it is quite
wrong to characterize petitioner's claim as an invitation
to enter unchartered territory. On the contrary, the
claim is manifestly of constitutional dimension.
This conclusion should end our inquiry. Whether the
Due Process Clause in any given case may provide a
"duplication of protections," ante, at 2 (SOUTER, J.,
concurring in judgment) is irrelevant to whether a
liberty interest is at stake.29 Even assuming the
dubious proposition that, in this case, due process
protection against a baseless prosecution may not
provide "a substantial increment to protection otherwise
available," ibid.,90 that is a consideration relevant only
to damages, not to the existence of constitutional
protection. Furthermore, that few of petitioner's injuries
flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him
does not make those injuries insubstantial, lb the
contrary, I can think of few powers that the State
possesses which, if arbitrarily imposed, can harm liberty
as substantially as the filing of criminal charges.
VIII
While the supposed adequacy of an alternative federal
remedy persuades JUSTICES GlNSBURG and SOUTER that
petitioner's claim fails, the availability of an alternative
state remedy convinces JUSTICE KENNEDY. I must
therefore explain why I do not agree with his reliance
on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). In 1975 I
helped plant the seed that ultimately flowered into the
Parratt doctrine. See Bonner v. Cougklin, 517 F. 2d
1311, 1318-1319 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545
F. 2d 565 (1976), cert, denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978)
(cited in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 541-542). The
plaintiff in Bonner, like the plaintiff in Parratt, claimed
that the negligence of state agents had deprived him of
a property interest "without due process of law." In
both cases, the claim was rejected because a predeprivation remedy was infeasible and the State's postdeprivation remedy was considered adequate to prevent a
constitutional violation. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at
543-544; Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d, at 1319-1320.
Both of those cases involved the type of ordinary
common law tort that can be committed by anyone.
Such torts are not deprivations "without due process"
simply because the tortfeasor is a public official.
The rationale of those cases is inapplicable to this case
whether one views the claim at issue as substantive or
"JUSTICE SOUTER relies in part upon 'pragmatic concerns about
subjecting government actors to two (potentially inconsistent) standards for the same conduct." Ante, at 2. I see no basis for that
concern in this case. Moreover, Congress properly weighs "pragmatic concerns" when it decides whether to provide a remedy for a
violation of federal law. Such concerns motivated the enactment of
§1983—a statute that provides a remedy for constitutional violations.
Thus, if such a violation is alleged—and I am satisfied that one is
here—we have a duty to enforce the statute without examining
pragmatic concerns.
"It seems to me quite wrong to attribute to a subsequent arrest the
reputations! and other harms caused by an unjustified accusation. In
addition, although JUSTICE GlNSBURG is prepared to hold that a Fourth
Amendment claim does not accrue until the baseless charges are
dismissed, at least some of the Courts of Appeals have held that the
arrest triggers the running of the statute of limitations. See, e. g.t Rote
v. Bartle, 871 F. 2d 331, 351 (CA3 1989); McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842
F. 2d 903, 906 (CA6 1988); Mack v. Varetas, 835 F. 2d 995, 1000 (CA2
1987); Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F. 2d 1144,1146 (CA9 1983). And, given
the disposition of this case, a majority of this Court might agree. In any
event, uncertainties about such matters counsel against constitutional
adjudication based upon "pragmatic concerns."
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procedural.81 If one views the petitioner's claim as one
of substantive due process, Parratt is categorically
inapplicable. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 125
(1990). Conversely, if one views his claim as one of
procedural due process, Parratt is also inapplicable,
because its rationale does not apply to officially authorized deprivations of liberty or property.
Thus, contrary to JUSTICE KENNEDY'S conclusion, ante,
at 5, Parratt's "precedential force" does not dispose of
this case. Petitioner was subjected to criminal charges
by an affirmative, deliberate act of a state official.32
The filing of criminal charges is effectuated through
established state procedures under which government
agents, such as respondent Oliver, are authorized to
act.33 In addition, the State's authorized agent knows
precisely when the deprivation of the liberty interest to
be free from criminal prosecution will occur—the
moment that the charges are filed.34 Therefore, as
with arrest or imprisonment, the State is capable of
providing a reasoned predeprivation determination, at
least ex parte, prior to the commencement of criminal
proceedings.35 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S., at
136-139. Failure to do so, or to do so in a meaningful
way, see supra, at 8-11, is constitutionally unacceptable.36 Thus, notwithstanding the possible availability
of a state tort action for malicious prosecution, §1983
provides a federal remedy for the constitutional violation
alleged by petitioner. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167,
183 (1961) ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked") (overruled in part not relevant here, Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 664-689 (1978)).
The remedy for a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause provided by §1983 is
not limited, as JUSTICE KENNEDY posits, ante, at 5, to
cases in which the injury has been caused by "a state
law, policy, or procedure." One of the primary purposes
of §1983 was to provide a remedy "against those who
representing a State in some capacity were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365
U. S., at 175-176 (emphasis in original). Therefore,
despite his suggestion to the contrary, ante, at 5,
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S interpretation of Parratt is in direct
conflict with both the language and the purposes of
§1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 172-187.

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against
*[e]very person" who under color of state authority
causes the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42
U. S. C. §1983. The Parratt doctrine is reconcilable
with §1983 only when its application is limited to
situations in which no constitutional violation occurs. In
the context of certain deprivations of property, due
process is afforded—and therefore the Constitution is not
violated—if an adequate postdeprivation state remedy is
available in practice to provide either the property's
prompt return or an equivalent compensation. See
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d, at 1320. In other
contexts, however, including criminal cases and most
cases involving a deprivation of liberty, the deprivation
is complete, and the Due Process Clause has been
violated, when the loss of liberty occurs.37 In those
contexts, any postdeprivation state procedure is merely
a remedy; because it does not provide the predeprivation
process that is "due," it does not avoid the constitutional
violation. In such cases, like this one, §1983 provides a
federal remedy regardless of the adequacy of the state
remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 183.
DC
The Court's judgment of affirmance is supported by
five different opinions. Significantly, none of them
endorses the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, and
none of them commands a majority. Of greatest importance, in the aggregate those opinions do not reject my
principal submission: the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment constrains the power of state
governments to accuse a citizen of an infamous crime.
I respectfully dissent.
JOHN H. BISBEE, Macomb, 111. (BARRY NAKELL on the
briefs) for petitioner; JAMES G. SOTOS, Itasca, 111.
(MICHAEL W. CONDON, CHARLES E. HERVAS,
MICHAEL D. BERSANI, and HERVAS, SOTOS &
CONDON P C , on the briefs) for respondents.
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"See 1 S. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation:
The Law of Section 1983, §3.15 pp. 211-212 (3d ed. 1991).
"This case is thus distinguishable from Hudson v. Palmer, 468
IT. S. 517 (1984), in which petitioner alleged that a prison guard
intentionally destroyed his property. Id, at 533 (holding that the
Due Process Clause is not violated by random and unauthorized
intentional deprivations of property "until and unless it provides or
refuses to. provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy*).
M
See n. 14, supra.
14
The Parratt doctrine is also inapplicable here because it does not
apply to cases in which the constitutional deprivation is complete
when the tort occurs. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S., at 125 (citing
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 338 (1986) (STEVENS, J n concurring in judgments)); see infra, at 22-23.
"See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., at 114 (holding that the
Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint of liberty following arrest").
M
See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422,
43S-437 (1982).
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In this action, petitioner health care clinics alleged, among other
things, that respondents, a coalition of antiabortion groups called
r

Postdeprivation procedures may provide adequate due process for
deprivations of liberty in limited circumstances. See, e.g.t Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 132 (1990) (1I]n situations where a
predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the
liberty interest at stake . . . or where the State is truly unable to
anticipate and prevent a random deprivation of a liberty interest,
postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due process"); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U. S., at 342 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments)
(noting that Parratt could defeat a procedural due process claim that
alleged a deprivation of liberty when "a predeprivation hearing was
definitionally impossible*); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 701
(1977) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the Court's holding
that the State's postdeprivation remedies for corporal punishment in
the schools satisfied the Due Process Clause, but noting that *a
postdeprivation remedy is sometimes constitutionally sufficient").
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